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WHY IT IS SO DIFFICULT TO PROVE INNOCENCE IN
CAPITAL CASES

Kenneth Williams*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The new Roberts Court has shown a willingness to allow defendants facing a death
sentence and even those already sentenced to death to prove their innocence. In one
case, a capital defendant sought to introduce evidence that another person committed the
rape, robbery, and murder that he was alleged to have committed.'
A state rule
prohibited him from doing so because his evidence barely raised a suspicion or inference
that another committed the crime. 2 A unanimous Supreme Court held that the rule did
not provide the defendant "a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense." 3 In
another case, a defendant who had already been convicted and sentenced to death offered
evidence for the first time during his federal habeas proceeding that he was not
4
responsible for the rape and murder and that another individual was.
Because of concerns about comity, federalism, and finality, federal courts are
normally precluded from considering any evidence or any claim not presented first to the
state courts. 5 A divided Supreme Court, however, held that the federal courts could
consider the evidence which exonerated him and implicated a third party and his other
constitutional claims. Otherwise, a miscarriage of justice would result because no
reasonable juror would have voted to convict the defendant if it had been presented with

*Kenneth Williams is a Professor of Law at Southwestern Law School. He has provided representation to six
Texas death row inmates.
1. Holmes v. S. C., 126 S. Ct. 1727, 1730-31 (2006).
2. Id. at 1731 (quoting State v. Gregory, 16 S.E.2d 532, 534 (S.C. 1941)).
3. Id. at 1735 (quoting Crane v. Ky., 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986)).
4. House v. Bell, 126 S.Ct. 2064, 2080-86 (2006).
5. E.g. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993) ("The reason most frequently advanced in our
cases for distinguishing between direct and collateral review is the State's interest in the finality of convictions
that have survived direct review within the state court system. . . . We have also spoken of comity and
federalism." (citations omitted)); Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 7 (1992) ("The writ strikes at finality of
a state criminal conviction, a matter of particular importance in a federal system."); McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S.
467, 491 (1991) ("Finality has special importance in the context of a federal attack on a state conviction....
Our federal system recognizes the independent power of a State to articulate societal norms through criminal
law; but the power of a State to pass laws means little if the State cannot enforce them."); Teague v. Lane, 489
U.S. 288, 308 (1989) ("'[T]he court never has defined the scope of the writ simply by reference to a perceived
need to assure that an individual accused of crime is afforded a trial free of constitutional error.'
. .. Rather, we
have recognized that interests of comity and finality must also be considered in determining the proper scope of
habeas review.") (quoting Kuhlman v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 447 (1986) (plurality)).
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the totality of the evidence. 6 Even if the trend of allowing inmates facing execution
more leeway to prove their innocence continues, these inmates will continue to face
major obstacles. This article examines two of the biggest obstacles that they face: the
continuing problem of poor representation and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act, using the case of Johnny Ray Conner as an illustration. This article
proposes some much needed reforms to ensure that inmates with valid claims of
innocence can be heard.
II.

THE GROWING PROBLEM OF INNOCENCE IN CAPITAL CASES

The Court's willingness to permit defendants facing execution to prove their
innocence is an acknowledgement that the system is fallible. Nothing proves the
system's fallibility more that the significant number of individuals convicted and
sentenced to death only to be later exonerated. According to the Death Penalty
Information Center, since 1973, approximately 123 individuals in 25 states have been
released from death row because evidence of their innocence materialized after they
were convicted and sentenced to death.7 Most of these inmates spent a significant
amount of time on death row and several came extremely close to being executed. In
fact, it would defy logic to believe that an innocent person has not already been
8
executed.
The Houston Chronicle recently published one of the most convincing accounts to
date of the possible execution of an innocent person.9 After two construction workers
were robbed and shot, one fatally, seventeen-year-old Ruben Cantu was charged with the
murder along with a fifteen-year-old co-defendant. 10 "No physical evidence-not even a
fingerprint or a bullet-tied Cantu to the crime." 11 He was convicted and sentenced to
death based solely on the eyewitness testimony of the surviving victim. 12 This
individual, an illegal immigrant at the time of the shooting who had been in the U.S. less
than a year, identified Cantu only after police officers showed him Cantu's photograph
on three separate occasions. 13 Days after he was convicted and sentenced to death,
Cantu wrote a letter to the residents of San Antonio declaring, "My name is Ruben M.
Cantu and I am only 18 years old. I got to the 9th grade and I have been framed in a
capital murder case."' 14 He was likely telling the truth.
The Chronicle discovered that the eyewitness recanted, saying that he felt

6. House, 126 S.Ct. at 2086.
7. Death Penalty Information Center, Innocence and the Death Penalty, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
article.php?did=412&scid=6 (accessed Oct. 8, 2006).
8. For instance, former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has stated, "If statistics are any
indication, the system may well be allowing some innocent defendants to be executed." Editorial, Justice
O'Conner on Executions, N.Y. Times A16 (July 5, 2001) (available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
article.php?scid=l 7&did=392) (last accessed Dec. 30, 2006).
9. Lise Olsen, Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man? http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/front/
3472872.html (Nov. 20, 2005).
10 Id.
11. Id. at "No Physical Evidence."
12. Id. at "Emotional Testimony."
13. Id. at "Another Visit."
14. Olsen, supra n. 9.
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pressured by the police to identify Cantu. 15 In addition, the fifteen-year-old codefendant stated under oath that Cantu was not with him on the night of the shooting and
was not otherwise involved in the crime. 16 As is typical of capital cases, his attorneys
did not conduct a complete investigation. According to the Houston Chronicle,
witnesses who could have possibly provided an alibi for Cantu on the night in question
were never interviewed and Cantu's habeas counsel never interviewed the only
17
eyewitness to the crime.
A responsible prosecutor would have responded to the Cantu story by conducting
an independent investigation into why the police would aggressively pressure an illegal
immigrant to make an identification, why a district attorney would bring capital murder
charges and seek to execute a defendant based on the testimony of one eyewitness, why
neither the police nor anyone else interviewed possible alibi witnesses, and why there
was a complete breakdown in the criminal justice system in her county. In fact, a
responsible prosecutor would seek reforms to ensure that an innocent person is never
again executed. The district attorney in question did neither of these things. Instead, she
announced that her office would begin an investigation into whether the eyewitness, who
18
barely survived the shooting, should be charged with felony murder!
The growing number of exonerations and cases like Cantu's 1 9 has made the public
much more skeptical about capital punishment. While a majority of Americans continue
to support capital punishment, the number has declined in recent years.
Furthermore,
when given the option of life without parole, polls continue to show that a majority of
Americans prefers that option. 2 1 Each year, juries are sentencing fewer defendants to
death. 22 Furthermore, a number of reforms designed to ensure that innocent persons are
not convicted and sentenced to death have been implemented. For instance, defendants
have been granted greater access to physical evidence in order to conduct DNA testing,
even after they have been convicted, 23 and North Carolina recently enacted legislation
establishing an Innocence Inquiry Commission that would have the jurisdiction to
investigate claims of innocence. 24 While the public's skepticism is healthy and the
reforms that have been enacted are laudable, innocent persons will likely be convicted
and sentenced to death because they continue to receive substandard representation.

15. Id. at "Was He Pressured."
16. Olsen, supra n. 9.
17. Id. at "No Physical Evidence."
18. Rick Casey, 'Murder by Perjury'inCantu Case? Houston Chronicle B I (Dec. 4, 2005).
19. Strong evidence has surfaced that another innocent individual was executed. Kate Zernike, In a 1980
Killing, A New Look at the Death Penalty, N.Y. Times AI5 (July 19, 2005) (discussing efforts to exonerate the
late Larry Griffin).
20. The Gallup poll found that 65% of the American public supported capital punishment, down from 80%
support in 1994. Joseph Carroll, Gallup Poll: Who Supports the Death Penalty? http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.
org/article.php?scid=23&did= 1266 (accessed Oct. 8, 2006).
21. Id.
22. Liz Halloran, PullingBack From The Brink: Why Are Death Sentences and Executions Dropping? U.S.
News & World Rpt. 36 (May 8, 2006).
23. E.g. Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2260 (2004) (mandating postconviction
DNA testing in order to receive federal funds for DNA labs).
24. N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 15A-1462 (West 2006); Patrik Jonsson, North Carolina Creates a New Route to
Exoneration,Christian Science Monitor 1 (Aug. 10, 2006).
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CONTINUED OBSTACLES

Lack of Competent Representation

Only a very small minority of those who commit murder are sentenced to death.
Justice White wrote in 1972 that "there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few
cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not."2 5 It is, however,
possible to explain the few cases in which death sentences are meted out. Almost
invariably, the defendant who is sentenced to death was poorly represented. The quality
of defense counsel is the most important factor in determining which defendants end up
on death row. As Justice Ginsburg has observed, "[p]eople who are well represented at
trial do not get the death penalty." 26 Effective lawyers not only prevent defendants from
receiving death sentences but also protect innocent persons from being convicted.
Attorney General Janet Reno stated,
A competent lawyer will skillfully cross-examine a witness and identify and disclose a lie
or a mistake. A competent lawyer will pursue weaknesses in the prosecutor's case, both to
test the basis for the prosecution and to challenge the prosecutor's ability to meet the
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. A competent lawyer will force a prosecutor
to take a hard, hard look at the gaps in the evidence.... A competent lawyer will know
how to conduct the necessary investigation so that an innocent defendant is not
27
convicted.... In the end, a good lawyer is the best defense against wrongful conviction.
Representing a defendant whom the state is seeking to execute presents additional
challenges. For instance, the lawyer must be familiar with the complex law and
28
procedure that applies only to capital cases.
Most inmates on death row are indigent and do not have the necessary resources to
employ counsel or to obtain the expert and investigative support they will need to mount
an effective defense. Therefore, they must rely on the indigent defense system. While
some public defenders perform admirably, many provide substandard representation to
their clients. 29 More than forty years ago, the Supreme Court established the right to
counsel for those accused of a serious crime. 3° The American Bar Association, however,
has studied indigent defense systems across the United States and found that "[fjorty
years after Gideon v. Wainwright, indigent defense in the United States is mired in a state
of crisis." 3 1 The ABA study found that lawyers who provide representation in indigent
defense systems sometimes are unable to furnish competent representation because they
25. Furman v. Ga., 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972).
26. AP News, Ginsburg Backs Ending Death Penalty, http://www.truthinjustice.org/ginsburg.htm (Apr. 9,
2001).
27. ABA Standing Comm. on Leg. Aid & Indigent Defs., Gideon's Broken Promise:America's Continuing
Quest for Equal Justice 3 (ABA 2004) (footnote omitted) (citing Off. of Justice Programs, U.S. Dept. of
Justice, Natl. Symposium on Indigent Defense 2000: Redefining Leadershipfor EqualJustice vi-vii (2000)).
28. The Supreme Court has held that "the penalty of death is qualitatively different" and as a result has
adopted requirements that are applicable only to capital cases. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)
(quoting Woodson v. NC., 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (holding that the sentencer must be empowered to take
into account all mitigating circumstances)).
29. ABA Standing Comm. on Leg. Aid & Indigent Defs., supra n. 27, at 7.
30. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
31. ABA Standing Comm. on Leg. Aid & Indigent Defs., supra n. 27, at 38.
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32
lack the necessary training, funding, time, and other resources.
The courts have been of little assistance in improving the indigent defense system.
First, the Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel only
applies to trial and the direct appeal. 33 Thus, some death row inmates must proceed
through the critical state habeas proceeding without the guarantee of counsel. 34 Second,
because the right to counsel does not apply to the habeas proceeding, the right to
effective assistance also does not apply. 35 There have been instances when habeas
counsel has missed critical filing deadlines, 36 has failed to raise valid legal claims, and
has repeatedly made the same legal argument in case after case. 3 7 Yet the inmate has no
avenue of relief for such dismal performance.
Although a death row inmate is entitled to relief if his trial or direct appeal counsel
performance is ineffective, 38 counsel's performance has to be so abysmal under the
standard adopted by the Supreme Court that very few inmates have been able to obtain
relief. In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant
must prove that counsel's performance was deficient 39 by showing that counsel
performed outside the prevailing norms of the profession. 40 In determining whether
counsel's performance is deficient, the Court indicated that considerable deference
should be given to counsel's strategic choices. 4 1 Thus, if the prosecution can portray
counsel's performance, no matter how inept, as a strategic decision, the defendant
usually will not prevail. 42 Even if a defendant is able to demonstrate that his counsel
performed inadequately under the Court's highly deferential standard, he must also prove
that he was prejudiced by counsel's performance. 43 If the prosecution can convince the
reviewing court that the defendant still would have been convicted even if counsel had
performed reasonably, the defendant will be denied relief.
The only specific standard the Court has established is to require counsel to
conduct an investigation if one is warranted under the circumstances. 44 Other than that,
the Court has refused to establish any new standards that counsel must meet, even in
capital cases. Because the test the Court has adopted is so malleable, counsel's

32. Id.
33. Murray v Giarratano,492 U.S. 1 (1989) (no right to counsel in postconviction proceedings).
34. Once an inmate's case proceeds to federal court, there is a statutory right to counsel. See 21 U.S.C. §
848(q)(4)(B) (1970); McFarlandv. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 859 (1994).
35. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 757 (1991).
36. E.g. In re Wilson, 442 F.3d 872, 875 (5th Cir. 2006) (The defendant's attorney filed his appeal forty
days after the filing deadline. The court, however, held that the appeal could be considered because Wilson
proved extraordinary circumstances that excused the late filing.); Allan Turner, 'Railroad Killer' Offers
Apology at Execution, Houston Chronicle Al (June 28, 2006) (The inmate was executed despite the fact that
his appellate attorney failed to file an appeal on his behalf.).
37. See e.g. Chuck Lindell, Lawyer Makes I Casefor 2 Killers, Austin-American-Statesman AOl (Feb. 26,
2006).
38. See Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
39. Id. at 687.
40. Id.at 687-88.
41. Id. at 689.
42. Id. at 690-91.
43. Strickland,466 U.S. at 687.
44. E.g. Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S. Ct. 2456, 2463-67 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524-25
(2003).
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performance is able to pass muster in most instances and most claims of ineffective
assistance are not successful. 45 Given the crucial role of counsel in proving a suspect's
innocence, the Court's efforts to give capital defendants more leeway to prove their
innocence will ultimately prove futile until it requires more of counsel in terms of
performance. If the Court were to adopt more stringent standards, pressure would then
be on jurisdictions to devote more resources to indigent defense because they would get
tired of the costs and inconvenience of retrying cases. Until this happens, we will
continue to see innocent persons convicted, sentenced to death, and even executed.
B.

The Antiterrorism andEffective Death Penalty Act

In 1996, Congress enacted and President Clinton signed into law the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). 4 6 AEDPA was enacted in order to reform
the habeas process. While it was designed to serve a number of purposes, its foremost
purpose was to expedite the death penalty process so that more inmates could be
executed in a shorter period of time.4 7 I will not provide an exhaustive review of
AEDPA as that task has already been undertaken by numerous legal scholars. 48 I will
discuss a few of the provisions that most severely impact a death row inmate's ability to
prove his innocence.
One of the most significant changes under AEDPA was the inclusion of a statute of
limitations.4 9 Prior to AEDPA, there was no statute of limitations in habeas matters.5 °
An inmate is now required to file a habeas petition within one year of his conviction,
becoming final on direct review, but there are also several complicated tolling
provisions.5 1 As a result, attorneys are often confused over the deadline for filing habeas
petitions, depriving many petitioners of any federal review of their convictions, and in
some cases, of their death sentences. 52 The problem with the statute of limitations is
compounded by the fact that some inmates may not have legal assistance in the

45. See Kenneth Williams, Ensuring the Capital Defendant's Right to Competent Counsel: It's Time for
Some Standards! 51 Wayne L. Rev. 129 (2005). Justice Thurgood Marshall objected to the Court's standard
because "it is so malleable that, in practice, it will either have no grip at all or will yield excessive variation in
the manner in which the Sixth Amendment is interpreted and applied by different courts." Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 707 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
46. Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
47. For a discussion of AEDPA's legislative history, review Larry W. Yackle, A Primeron the New Habeas
Corpus Statute, 44 Buff. L. Rev. 381 (1996).
48. E.g. Randy Hertz & James S. Liebmann, FederalHabeas Corpus Practiceand Procedure vol. 1, 5-107
(4th ed., LexisNexis 2001); Marshall J. Hartman & Jeanette Nyden, Habeas Corpus and the New Federalism
after the Anti-Terrorismand Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 30 John Marshall L. Rev. 337 (1997).
49. Under AEDPA, in most circumstances an inmate must file a habeas petition challenging his conviction
and sentence within one year of the conviction becoming final on direct review. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544
U.S. 408, 410 (2005) ("[AEDPA] establishes a I-year statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas corpus
petition."); Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 216 (2002) ("[AEDPA] requires a state prisoner seeking a federal
habeas corpus remedy to file his federal petition within one year after his state conviction has become 'final."').
A conviction becomes final when the Supreme Court denies certiorari review or when the time to file a petition
for writ of certiorari expires. See Clay v. U. S., 537 U.S. 522, 527-28 (2003).
50. Mayle v. Felix, 125 S. Ct. 2562, 2569 (2005) ("In enacting AEDPA in 1996, Congress imposed for the
first time a fixed time limit for collateral attacks in federal court on a judgment of conviction.").
51. Pace,544 U.S. at 408.
52. Wilson, 422 F.3d at 875.
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53
preparation of their habeas petitions.
The statute of limitations also provides an inmate with a very short time to develop
evidence of his possible innocence. It has frequently been the case that evidence
exonerating a death row inmate was not immediately revealed.5 4 It will often be difficult
to obtain evidence of the inmate's innocence within such a short time period. An
obvious response might be simply to file another habeas petition once the inmate has
obtained evidence of his innocence. AEDPA, however, makes it almost impossible to do
so.55 Thus, an inmate could be in a situation where he has strong evidence of his

innocence but no opportunity to present the evidence to a court.
Another problem for death-sentenced inmates seeking to prove their innocence is
the requirement that they first present their claims to the state courts before the federal
courts will be allowed to consider their claims. 56 Proponents of this requirement argue
that punishing and controlling crime is the quintessential state function and that state
courts should, therefore, be allowed the opportunity to correct any mistakes before any
federal review occurs. 57 The state exhaustion requirement is problematic for several
reasons. First, an inmate's attorney may fail to present his claim of innocence to the
58
state court, thereby forfeiting any federal review of the claim in most circumstances.
Second, the state court proceeding is often perfunctory; it is frequently the case that no
meaningful review of the defendant's claims takes place. For instance, in many states,
the prevailing practice is for the state district attorney or state attorney general to draft
the findings of fact and the order denying relief.59 Third, the state court often does not
adequately explain its decisions.
Finally, the state court's findings of fact and
61
conclusions of law are entitled to deference in federal court.
The most significant provisions of AEDPA are contained in section 2254(d), which
limits the circumstances under which a federal court can grant a writ of habeas corpus.
Section 2254(d) provides as follows:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the

53. John H. Blume, AEDPA: The "Hype" and the "Bite", 91 Cornell L. Rev. 259, 290 (2006).
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.
54. For
information
on
exonerees,
review
php?scid=45&did=l 149#Sec05a (Sept., 2004).
55. Under AEDPA, a claim that was presented in a previous federal petition but is offered again in a second
or successive federal petition "shall be dismissed." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) (2000). A claim raised for the first
time in a second or successive petition may be considered-but only in narrow circumstances. Id at §
2244(b)(2).
56. Id. at § 2254(b)(l)(A).
57. See Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 585 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) ("Nowhere has a 'proper respect
for state functions' been more essential to our federal system than in the administration of criminal justice.
This Court repeatedly has recognized that criminal law is primarily the business of the States, and that absent
the most extraordinary circumstances the federal courts should not interfere with the States' administration of
that law." (citations omitted)).
58. E.g. House, 126 S. Ct. at 2064 (allowing unexhausted claims to be considered in order to prevent a
manifest injustice).
59. Blume, supra n. 53, at 296. ("Some readers may be surprised to learn that in a number of states this is
the prevailing practice. The attorney for the prosecuting agency submits a proposed order that the court
frequently signs without making a single change. Many of these orders contain unsupported factual findings,
nonexistent procedural defaults, and tenuous legal conclusions. This practice, while generally frowned upon, is
also generally tolerated.").
60. Id. at 293.
61. Id.at263-64.
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judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was
adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;
or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable62determination of the facts in
light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
While the Supreme Court has not cleared up all the questions concerning the
63
meaning of section 2254(d), it has said that an inmate must do more than prove that a
64
state court decision is incorrect in order to obtain relief.
The Supreme Court has held that section 2254(d) requires that deference be given
to a state court's findings of fact and its legal conclusions. 6 5 To illustrate the effect that
section 2254(d) would have on an inmate seeking to prove his innocence, suppose an
inmate files a habeas petition in state court, as required, claiming that his attorney was
ineffective for failing to interview his alibi witnesses. The state court subsequently
denies the claim, finding that the witnesses were not credible and that the attorney was
not ineffective because of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt. In order
to obtain relief in federal court, the inmate would have to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the state court's finding that his witnesses were not credible was incorrect
and that the state court's conclusion that the evidence of his guilt was overwhelming was
not only incorrect but also unreasonable.
Finally, if the inmate is unable to overcome section 2254(d) and loses in federal
district court, his right to appeal is not automatic. He must apply to a federal appeals
court for a Certificate of Appealability. 6 6 In order to have his appeal considered, he
must convince a federal appellate court that "jurists of reason could disagree with the
district court's resolution of his constitutional claim or that jurists could conclude the
67
issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further."
AEDPA is having the effect that its drafters intended it to have: it has made it more
difficult for all inmates, including those who may be innocent, to obtain relief.68 It also
compounds the problem of poor representation. In the next section, I will discuss the
case of a death row inmate whom I was appointed to represent and the difficulties I have
encountered in trying to prove his innocence.

62. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000).
63. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005) (stating that section 2254(d)'s "conditions for the grant of
federal habeas relief have not been established").
64. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) ("The 'unreasonable application' clause requires the state
court decision to be more than incorrect or erroneous." (quoting 28 USC § 2254(d))).
65. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n. 7 (1997) (stating that 28 USC § 2254(d) dictates a "highly
deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings"). The AEDPA, however, does not mention the word
deference, and scholars have discussed the constitutional problem of having federal courts defer to state courts'
interpretation of the U.S. Constitution. See James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, "Some Effectual Power":
Courts, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 696 (1998).
The Quantity and Quality of DecisionmakingRequired ofArticle 111

66. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(b)-(c)(l)(A) (2000).
67. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003).
68. Blume, supra n. 53, at 284 ("Less than 1%of state prisoners who file federal habeas petitions ultimately
prevail.").
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THE CASE OF JOHNNY RAY CONNER

On May 17, 1998, the owner of a Houston, Texas convenience store was murdered
during a botched robbery. 69 Although there were several eyewitnesses to the crime, two
of the eyewitnesses were unable to make any identification of the assailant. 70 The other
eyewitnesses differed as to the assailant's height and clothing, whether he had facial hair,
and whether he wore a baseball cap. 7 1 The only detail they all agreed about was that the
72
assailant ran very fast from the scene of the crime.
After the investigation focused on Mr. Conner, his picture was shown to the
eyewitnesses who were able to provide a description of the assailant. 73 He was
identified as the assailant by those eyewitnesses. 74 One, however, admitted that she
picked his photograph out of the array because his was the only one containing Houston
Police Department booking numbers. 75 After the eyewitness identifications, Mr. Conner
was formally charged with the murder and attempted robbery of the storeowner, and he
76
surrendered to the authorities.
Because Mr. Conner was indigent and the state was seeking the death penalty, the
trial court appointed two attorneys to defend him. 77 Both of the lawyers appointed to
represent him had extensive criminal law experience and had previously defended others
charged with capital murder. 78 Although funds had been appropriated to employ

69. Connerv. State, 67 S.W.3d 192, 196 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
70. See Memo. & Or. 4, (Mar. 22, 2005) (on file with author).
71. Id. at 17, 18. ("[Eyewitnesses] could not agree on whether the gunman wore a hat or not or, if he did,
on the color of the hat; they could not agree on whether he wore shorts or long pants or on the length or color
of the shorts or pants; ... in addition to the explicit inconsistencies, two of the witnesses testified that they saw
the gunman's face for an extended period... yet neither testified that the gunman had Conner's distinctive
tattoo of a teardrop under his eye ... . Martha Meyers testified that the robber was between five feet [ten]
inches and six feet one inch tall ... but Conner's medical records show that he is only five feet six inches
tall.").
72. Id. at 3-4.
73. Id.at 4.
74. Id.
75. Martha Meyers admitted that she noticed the police booking numbers on Mr. Conner's photograph and
that the presence of these numbers influenced her identification of Mr. Conner as the man who fled from the
crime scene on May 17, 1998:
Q: Isn't it a fact, ma'am, the only particular individual in this particular grouping that has any type
of numbers that denotes any type of police record is number five?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Would that have anything to have done with you picking out number five?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Are you absolutely positive about that?
A: Yes, sir.
Pretrial Transcr. vol. 2, 51 (June 7, 1999) (on file with author).
76. Memo. & Or. 4.
77. See Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. § 26.052(4)(e) (Supp. 2006) ("The presiding judge of the district court
in which a capital felony is filed shall appoint two attorneys.").
78. Ricardo Rodriguez was the lead counsel for Mr. Conner and has been involved in approximately sixteen
capital cases. Transc. Procs. 30 (Mar. 4, 2005). Jonathan Munier was appointed as co-counsel and based on
his experience is on the list of lawyers approved by the State of Texas to represent defendants in capital murder
cases. Id. at 55.
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experts, Mr. Conner's trial attorneys did not hire an eyewitness expert to discuss the
fallibility of eyewitness identifications, especially cross-racial identifications, as had
occurred in this case. 79 Mr. Conner had a troubled upbringing, however, defense
counsel did not retain a mitigation specialist as is typically done in capital cases
involving defendants with backgrounds like Mr. Conner's. 8 Mr. Conner informed his
trial counsel that he had injured his leg in high school playing football. 8 1 Given the
eyewitness testimony that the assailant ran quickly from the crime scene, any evidence
that Mr. Conner might have had difficulty running could have been crucial in raising
reasonable doubt. At trial, however, defense counsel chose to put on no defense other
than cross-examining the state's witnesses. Not surprisingly, Mr. Conner was convicted
and sentenced to death.
After Mr. Conner was unsuccessful on direct appeal and in obtaining a writ of
habeas corpus in state court, I was appointed to represent him in his federal habeas
proceedings. One of the first things I did was review Mr. Conner's medical records. I
learned from these records that he had an ongoing problem with his foot after he broke
his leg in high school. The records indicated that he had developed a condition known as
"foot drop." According to an expert that I retained for the case, "an individual with such
an impairment would walk with a limp." 82 The expert further indicated that "if he
attempted to move faster, either to walk faster or to run, that it would become more
noticeable and more prominent." 83 Even though each eyewitness had said that the
assailant ran extremely fast from the crime scene and none of the witnesses noticed the
assailant having any difficulty running, the information concerning Mr. Conner's foot
condition was never presented to the jury that convicted him and sentenced him to death.
Therefore, in his federal writ, I alleged that Mr. Conner had received ineffective
assistance of counsel. During the evidentiary hearing, the state attempted to refute the
medical records and even the prison records that noted Mr. Conner's foot problem by
producing a videotape, shot without Mr. Conner's knowledge, purportedly showing him
85
walking normally. 84 Almost comically, the video showed him walking with a limp.
Mr. Conner's trial counsel defended the decision not to investigate Mr. Conner's foot
condition by stating that "I did not believe at the time and still do not believe that it was a
credible defense to argue that the eyewitnesses had the wrong person because Mr.
86
Conner allegedly had a limp."
The federal district judge granted the writ of habeas corpus and ordered that he was
entitled to a new trial. 87 She held that trial counsel's performance was deficient because
they did no investigation into Mr. Conner's medical history and that, given the weakness

79. Id. at 38.
80. id.at 43.
81. Id.at 42.
82. Transc. Procs. 17.
83 Id. at 22.
84. Id at 138-40.
85. Id. at 21.
86. Aff. Ricardo Rodriguez 3 (Apr. 9, 2001) (prepared in response to Mr. Conner's claim that he was
convicted and sentenced to death as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel) (on file with author).
87. Memo. & Or.
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of the state's case, his conviction was affected by their deficient performance. 88 The
state is urging the appellate court to overturn the granting of the writ becuase it was not
fully presented to the state courts by Mr. Conner's state habeas counsel as required by
AEDPA. Thus, should Mr. Conner be denied the opportunity to prove his innocence, it
will be due to the failings of his attorneys.
V.

SUGGESTED REFORMS

What can be done to ensure that defendants like Johnny Ray Conner, who have a
plausible claim of innocence, are afforded a meaningful opportunity to prove their
innocence? First and foremost, defendants charged with capital crimes need better
attorneys to represent them. As discussed earlier, that will happen once the Supreme
Court establishes more stringent standards for determining when defendants have been
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. Second, the Supreme Court has held that the
execution of an innocent individual would be constitutionally intolerable. 89 Incredibly,
however, the court has yet to hold that an inmate can make a simple claim during his
habeas proceeding that he is innocent. 9° The execution of an innocent person would
obviously be a travesty and constitute a constitutional violation. Therefore, an inmate
should be allowed to make such a claim. Furthermore, all procedural barriers to
considering a claim of innocence ought to be eliminated. 9 1 An inmate should be allowed
to make a claim of innocence whenever he has evidence that raises the possibility that he
is innocent. For instance, it should not matter whether he has previously presented the
claim to the state courts. There should be no concern about the proliferation of such
claims as our courts are well equipped to distinguish meritorious claims from those that
are frivolous.
Finally, AEDPA has created a unique situation whereby state courts in most
instances will be the final arbiters of federal constitutional law. 92 Because AEDPA
requires deference to a state court's interpretation of federal rights, there is the real
possibility state courts will interpret the Constitution inconsistently, and such
interpretations must stand-even if they are incorrect-as long as they are reasonable.
Congress needs to ensure the integrity and uniformity of federal law by repealing or
modifying this section of AEDPA.

88. Id.
89. In Herrera v. Collins, the court assumed without deciding that "in a capital case a truly persuasive
demonstration of 'actual innocence' made after trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional
and warrant federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a claim." 506 U.S. 390,
417 (1993). Justice O'Connor added that "I cannot disagree with the fundamental legal principle that executing
the innocent is inconsistent with the Constitution." Id. at 419 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
90. In House, the Court was asked to decide whether a death row inmate would be permitted to raise a
freestanding claim of innocence but the Court "decline[d] to resolve this issue." 126 S. Ct. at 2087.
91. For instance, federal habeas relief is available to state prisoners only after they have exhausted their
claims in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1Hc). Furthermore, a petitioner who fails to comply with a state
procedural rule is barred from obtaining habeas relief unless he can demonstrate cause for the procedural
default and prejudice attributable thereto. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991).
92. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
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CONCLUSION

We continue to run the risk that an innocent person will be executed. These risks can
be substantially minimized by providing defendants with better attorneys and by making
a few modifications of AEDPA. The federal habeas process was changed in 1996 in
order to accelerate the execution process. The habeas process is still flawed, however,
because of the impediments an inmate faces in seeking to prove his innocence. Federal
habeas law, therefore, needs to be changed again, this time in order to achieve greater
accuracy and justice.
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